# a theory of incentives in procurement and regulation

A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation: Understanding Motivations for Better Outcomes

**a theory of incentives in procurement and regulation** serves as a crucial framework for understanding how organizations and governments can design policies and contracts that align the interests of various stakeholders. Whether it’s a government agency procuring goods and services or regulatory bodies overseeing industries, the way incentives are structured profoundly influences behavior, efficiency, and overall success. This article explores the fundamental concepts behind incentive theory in these contexts, shedding light on why careful design matters and offering insights into practical applications.

## What Is a Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation?

At its core, a theory of incentives in procurement and regulation examines how to motivate agents—such as contractors, suppliers, or regulated firms—to act in ways that meet the principal’s objectives. In procurement, the principal might be a government agency seeking quality services at the lowest cost; in regulation, it might be a public authority aiming to ensure safety, fairness, or environmental standards.

The challenge lies in the fact that agents often have their own interests, which may not naturally align with those of the principal. This divergence is known as a principal-agent problem. For example, a contractor may cut corners to save costs, or a utility company might underinvest in infrastructure if not properly incentivized.

Understanding the incentives at play and designing mechanisms that align interests can mitigate inefficiencies, reduce risks, and promote accountability.

## The Role of Incentives in Procurement

Procurement is not just about selecting the cheapest bid. It involves structuring contracts that encourage suppliers to deliver quality, innovate, and manage risks effectively.

## Aligning Supplier and Buyer Interests

One of the primary challenges in procurement is ensuring that suppliers have the right motivation to fulfill contract requirements. Incentives can be monetary—like performance bonuses or penalties—or non-monetary, such as reputation effects or future business opportunities.

For instance, performance-based contracts tie payments to the achievement of specific outcomes rather than inputs or effort. This shifts the risk to suppliers to deliver results, encouraging them to optimize efficiency and quality.

## Types of Incentive Mechanisms in Procurement

There are several common incentive mechanisms used to align interests in procurement:

- **Fixed-Price Contracts:** Suppliers agree to deliver a product or service at a set price, bearing the risk of cost overruns but incentivized to manage costs efficiently.
- **Cost-Reimbursement Contracts:** Buyers cover actual costs plus a fee, which may reduce supplier incentives to control costs unless specific controls are in place.
- **Incentive Contracts:** Combine elements of fixed-price and cost-reimbursement, offering bonuses for cost savings or penalties for delays.
- **Performance-Based Contracts:** Payments hinge on meeting predefined performance metrics, encouraging quality and innovation.

Choosing the right contract type depends on factors like project complexity, risk distribution, and the capability of suppliers.

# Incentives in Regulatory Frameworks

Regulation often seeks to correct market failures, protect consumers, and ensure public welfare. Here, incentives are used to encourage firms to comply voluntarily and go beyond minimum standards.

## Regulatory Incentive Structures

Regulators use various incentive tools to influence behavior:

- **Price Caps and Rate-of-Return Regulation:** Utilities, for example, may be regulated through price caps that limit how much they can charge, incentivizing cost reductions and efficiency.
- **Information Disclosure:** Transparency requirements can motivate firms to improve practices due to reputational concerns.
- **Tradable Permits:** Emissions trading schemes create economic incentives for pollution reduction by allowing firms to buy and sell pollution allowances.
- **Penalties and Fines:** Financial sanctions discourage non-compliance and unsafe practices.

These mechanisms are designed to balance the need for compliance with flexibility, allowing firms to find cost-effective solutions.

## Addressing the Problem of Regulatory Capture

A critical concern in regulation is the risk of regulatory capture, where agencies act in the interest of the industries they regulate rather than the public. Designing incentives for regulators themselves—such as performance-based assessments or oversight mechanisms—helps ensure that regulatory bodies remain accountable and aligned with public goals.

# Behavioral Insights and Incentive Design

Modern theories of incentives increasingly incorporate behavioral economics, recognizing that human decision-making is influenced by more than just financial rewards.

## Non-Monetary Incentives

Factors such as social norms, fairness perceptions, and intrinsic motivation play vital roles. For example, public recognition for sustainable business practices can motivate firms to exceed regulatory standards.

### Complexity and Information Asymmetry

In many procurement and regulatory settings, principals lack complete information about agents' abilities or actions. Incentive theory helps design contracts that mitigate these asymmetries through mechanisms like monitoring, reporting requirements, or self-selection incentives.

## Practical Tips for Applying Incentive Theory in Procurement and Regulation

For practitioners looking to leverage a theory of incentives in procurement and regulation, consider the following approaches:

1. **Clearly Define Objectives:** Understand what outcomes matter most—cost, quality, innovation, compliance—and tailor incentives accordingly.
2. **Balance Risk and Reward:** Allocate risks to parties best able to manage them, and design rewards that motivate desired behaviors.
3. **Use Performance Metrics Wisely:** Metrics should be measurable, relevant, and resistant to manipulation to truly drive improvements.
4. **Incorporate Flexibility:** Allow room for innovation and adaptation within contracts and regulations to respond to changing circumstances.
5. **Promote Transparency and Accountability:** Clear reporting and monitoring help maintain trust and ensure incentive mechanisms function as intended.

## The Future of Incentive Theory in Public Policy

As procurement and regulatory environments grow more complex, integrating technology and data analytics will enhance the design and enforcement of incentive structures. Smart contracts, for instance, could automate performance-based payments, reducing administrative burdens and increasing transparency.

Moreover, growing emphasis on sustainability and social responsibility means incentive theories must evolve to incorporate environmental and social goals, not just economic efficiency.

A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation offers a powerful lens for understanding and shaping behaviors in complex systems. By thoughtfully aligning motivations, policymakers and organizations can foster innovation, accountability, and better public outcomes—ultimately benefiting society as a whole.

# Frequently Asked Questions

## What is the main focus of the theory of incentives in procurement and regulation?

The theory of incentives in procurement and regulation primarily focuses on designing mechanisms and contracts that align the interests of agents (such as contractors or firms) with those of the principal (such as government or regulators) to ensure efficient and cost-effective delivery of goods and services.

## How does asymmetric information impact procurement processes according to incentive theory?

Asymmetric information, where one party has more or better information than the other, can lead to issues like moral hazard and adverse selection in procurement. Incentive theory addresses these problems by creating contracts that incentivize truthful information sharing and effort exertion despite information gaps.

## What role do performance-based contracts play in regulatory incentives?

Performance-based contracts align the contractor's compensation with measurable outcomes or performance metrics, encouraging higher quality and efficiency. In regulation, such contracts serve as incentive mechanisms to motivate regulated firms to meet or exceed standards.

## Why is incentive compatibility important in procurement contracts?

Incentive compatibility ensures that the designed contract motivates agents to act according to the principal's objectives, such as minimizing costs or maximizing quality, without exploiting informational advantages or shirking responsibilities.

## What challenges do regulators face when applying incentive theory in real-world procurement?

Regulators often face challenges like incomplete information, difficulty in measuring performance, risk allocation, and balancing multiple objectives (cost, quality, service continuity), making the design of effective incentive schemes complex.

### How can incentive theory improve public procurement outcomes?

By using incentive-compatible contracts and regulatory frameworks, incentive theory helps reduce inefficiencies, prevent corruption, encourage innovation, and ensure that suppliers deliver value for money in public procurement.

### What is the difference between ex ante and ex post incentives in regulation?

Ex ante incentives are designed to influence behavior before a contract or regulation is implemented (e.g., through bidding mechanisms), while ex post incentives affect behavior after implementation, such as penalties or rewards based on observed performance.

### How does the theory of incentives address risk-sharing in procurement contracts?

The theory provides frameworks to allocate risks between principals and agents optimally, ensuring that risks are borne by the party best able to manage them, which promotes efficiency and fair compensation in procurement contracts.

### Can incentive theory help prevent regulatory capture in procurement?

Yes, by designing transparent and performance-based incentive mechanisms, incentive theory can reduce opportunities for regulatory capture by aligning the interests of regulators and firms with those of the public and minimizing undue influence.

## Additional Resources

A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation: Navigating Efficiency and Accountability

**a theory of incentives in procurement and regulation** offers a critical framework for understanding how governments and organizations can align the behavior of contractors, suppliers, and regulated entities with broader policy objectives. This theory delves into the mechanisms that motivate actors involved in public procurement processes and regulatory environments to act efficiently, transparently, and in the public interest. It addresses the challenges inherent in designing contracts and regulatory policies that mitigate risks of opportunism, moral hazard, and information asymmetry.

At its core, the theory of incentives in procurement and regulation recognizes that stakeholders operate within a complex web of motivations and constraints. Procuring agencies and regulators aim to achieve outcomes such as cost-effectiveness, quality assurance, and compliance, while suppliers and regulated firms seek to maximize their own benefits, sometimes at odds with public goals. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for crafting incentive-compatible mechanisms that promote cooperation and optimal performance.

# Foundations of Incentive Theory in Procurement

Procurement involves purchasing goods, services, or works by public or private entities, frequently under conditions of uncertainty and asymmetric information. The incentive structures embedded in procurement contracts can significantly influence supplier behavior, project outcomes, and public value.

## Principal-Agent Problems and Information Asymmetry

A central concern in procurement is the principal-agent problem, where the procuring entity (principal) delegates tasks to a contractor or supplier (agent) who holds private information and may have divergent interests. This asymmetry can lead to adverse selection—where the procuring agency selects a less capable contractor—and moral hazard, where the contractor may shirk responsibilities or reduce quality after contract award.

Incentive theory proposes contract designs to mitigate these risks. For example, performance-based contracts link payments to measurable outcomes, encouraging contractors to meet or exceed standards. Conversely, fixed-price contracts shift cost overruns to suppliers but may incentivize corners-cutting. Balancing risk allocation is thus a critical feature.

## Types of Incentive Mechanisms in Procurement

Several incentive mechanisms have been widely studied and applied:

- **Cost-plus contracts:** Reimburse actual costs plus a fixed fee, offering low risk to suppliers but weak incentives for cost control.
- **Fixed-price contracts:** Set a predetermined price, incentivizing cost efficiency but raising the risk of reduced quality or scope.
- **Performance-based contracting:** Payments tied to specific performance

metrics, aligning supplier efforts with desired outcomes.

- **Competitive bidding:** Encourages suppliers to offer the best value, but may lead to underbidding and project delays if bids are unrealistically low.

Each has advantages and drawbacks in different contexts, underscoring the need for tailored approaches.

# Incentive Theory Applied to Regulatory Frameworks

Regulation governs behavior in sectors ranging from utilities and telecommunications to environmental protection. The theory of incentives guides how regulators design rules and enforcement to achieve compliance and efficiency.

## Regulatory Incentives and Compliance

Traditional command-and-control regulation often relies on prescriptive rules and penalties for non-compliance. While straightforward, this approach can be rigid and costly. Incentive-based regulation, by contrast, leverages economic motives to encourage desired behavior.

Examples include:

- **Price caps and rate-of-return regulation:** Utilities are incentivized to minimize costs while maintaining service quality.
- **Tradable permits:** Environmental regulators allocate pollution allowances that firms can buy or sell, creating financial incentives to reduce emissions.
- **Performance standards with rewards:** Firms meeting or exceeding standards may receive tax benefits or reduced oversight.

Such mechanisms help balance the trade-offs between regulatory stringency, enforcement costs, and innovation incentives.

## Challenges in Designing Regulatory Incentives

A key challenge is addressing the information asymmetry between regulators and firms, as regulators may lack full visibility into firms' operations or costs. This can lead to regulatory capture, where firms exert undue influence, or to inefficiencies if incentives are poorly calibrated.

Moreover, dynamic incentives must consider long-term impacts, encouraging firms not only to comply today but to innovate and invest in sustainable practices. Incorporating mechanisms like periodic reviews and adaptive regulations can help maintain incentive alignment over time.

# Comparing Incentives in Procurement and Regulation

Though distinct, procurement and regulation share common incentive challenges—chief among them, aligning private actors' behavior with public goals under uncertainty.

- **Scope:** Procurement focuses on discrete transactions or projects, while regulation often addresses ongoing behavior across an industry.
- **Contractual complexity:** Procurement contracts can be highly detailed, specifying deliverables and penalties, whereas regulatory frameworks operate through statutory rules and oversight.
- **Risk allocation:** Procurement contracts explicitly allocate risks between parties; regulatory incentives often use indirect economic signals.

Understanding these differences helps policymakers craft complementary strategies that leverage incentive theory effectively.

## The Role of Accountability and Transparency

In both procurement and regulatory contexts, the effectiveness of incentive structures depends heavily on transparency and accountability mechanisms. Public reporting, independent audits, and participatory oversight can reduce information asymmetries and curb opportunistic behavior.

For instance, e-procurement platforms enhance transparency by publishing bids and contract awards, reducing corruption risks. Similarly, regulatory agencies with strong monitoring capabilities and stakeholder engagement can enforce incentives more credibly.

# Emerging Trends and Innovations in Incentive Design

Recent developments have introduced novel approaches to incentive theory in procurement and regulation:

- **Behavioral insights:** Incorporating psychological factors to design nudges that encourage compliance without heavy-handed enforcement.
- **Digital technologies:** Blockchain and smart contracts automate performance measurements and payments, increasing contract enforceability.
- **Collaborative procurement:** Multi-stakeholder partnerships foster shared incentives for innovation and social value creation.
- **Adaptive regulation:** Dynamic frameworks that evolve based on data and stakeholder feedback, maintaining effective incentives over time.

These innovations promise to enhance the efficacy of incentive mechanisms, though they also introduce complexity requiring careful evaluation.

The theory of incentives in procurement and regulation remains a vital area of study for improving public sector efficiency and accountability. By analyzing how incentives shape behavior and outcomes, policymakers and practitioners can design smarter contracts and regulatory policies that better serve societal needs.

## A Theory Of Incentives In Procurement And Regulation



**a theory of incentives in procurement and regulation: A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation** Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole, 1993 Based on their work in the application of principal-agent theory to questions of regulation, Laffont and Tirole develop a synthetic approach to this field, focusing on the regulation of natural monopolies such as military contractors, utility companies and transportation authorities.

**a theory of incentives in procurement and regulation: Theorie der Unternehmung** Horst Albach, Peter-J. Jost, 2013-08-13 Der Band stellt unterschiedliche Themenbereiche vor: die

Gestaltung von Anreizverträgen, das Wissens- und Personalmanagement, Information und Wettbewerb, Governance-Strukturen und Unternehmensnetzwerke. Methodisch werden neben spiel- und vertragstheoretischen Beiträgen auch experimentelle und empirische Studien präsentiert. Schwerpunkte bilden Organisation und Motivation.

**a theory of incentives in procurement and regulation: Regulieren oder Nichtregulieren; das ist hier die Frage** Markus A. Hessler, 2015-03-05 Die Telekommunikationsmärkte zeigen – nicht zuletzt aufgrund der Konvergenz von Telekommunikation, Internet, Medien und Unterhaltung und der Konsolidierungstendenzen – weiterhin eine ungebrochene Dynamik. Über 15 Jahre nach der Liberalisierung der Telekommunikationsmärkte sind die vertikal integrierten staatlichen Monopole weitgehend wettbewerblichen Märkten gewichen – mit überaus positiven Folgen für die Volkswirtschaft und die Konsumenten. Die Telekommunikation hat eine große und weiter zunehmende Bedeutung sowohl für das Privat- als auch für das Berufsleben der Menschen und darüber hinaus für die gesamtwirtschaftliche und -gesellschaftliche Entwicklung. Mit immer besseren Endgeräten und leistungsfähigeren Anwendungen steigt auch die Nachfrage nach schnelleren und besseren Internetzugängen. Im Zusammenhang mit leistungsfähigeren Internetzugängen ist auch die Entwicklung der Next Generation Networks (NGN) und des Next Generation Access (NGA) bedeutend, da es sich bei diesen um neue bessere Netzarchitekturen handelt. Die hohe Bedeutung moderner Breitbandanschlüsse für die volkswirtschaftliche Entwicklung erklärt auch die starke Involvierung von Politik, Öffentlichkeit, Wirtschaft und Wissenschaft in die Diskussionen um Fragen des Breitbandausbaus und der Netzneutralität. In dem vorliegenden Werk werden zunächst die relevanten Marktentwicklungen und technische Grundlagen der Telekommunikation behandelt. Im wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Grundlagenteil wird analysiert, unter welchen Bedingungen in einer Marktwirtschaft ein Staatseingriff gerechtfertigt und geboten ist. Dabei werden Grundlagen der Marktwirtschaft und Ordnungsökonomik, die normative Theorie der Regulierung, Ergebnismängel, Regulierungsgrundlagen, die positive Theorie der Regulierung und die Netzökonomie erläutert. Im letzten Teil der Arbeit werden die Telekommunikationsmärkte auf ebendiese Bedingungen untersucht und Empfehlungen gegeben, welche Probleme mit welchen Maßnahmen behandelt werden sollten. Dabei geht es um Fragen der Regulierung der „letzten Meile“, der Netzneutralität, des Breitbandausbaus, um Externalitäten und Informationsmängel.

**a theory of incentives in procurement and regulation: Dynamische Modelle zur Theorie der Regulierung** Gudrun Bobzin, 2019-06-12 In den letzten Jahren hat der Staat versucht, in vielen Sektoren den Wettbewerb zu intensivieren. Dennoch verfügen weiterhin viele Unternehmen über Marktmacht und es besteht die Gefahr, dass sich erneut Monopole herausbilden. Um dieser Entwicklung entgegenzuwirken, werden Regulierungsbehörden eingesetzt. Gudrun Bobzin analysiert die Wirkungsweise zweier Regulierungsinstrumente, nämlich der Beschränkung der Rentabilität und der fallweisen Preisregulierung. Dabei wird das Verhalten der Unternehmung im Zeitablauf den Vorgaben der Regulierungsbehörde untergeordnet. Auf der Grundlage der ökonomischen Theorie der Regulierung und der mathematischen Theorie der optimalen Kontrolle bildet die Autorin das dynamische Verhalten des Unternehmens ab und zeigt damit wesentliche Ansatzpunkte für die Gestaltung einer optimalen Regulierung auf.

**a theory of incentives in procurement and regulation:** Dynamische Koordinationsmechanismen für das Controlling Volker Trauzettel, 2015 Mit Hilfe von Principal-Agent-Modellen werden Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten von Anreiz- und Vorgabesystemen als Instrumente des Controlling analysiert. Wenn ein Agent (z. B. Spartenleiter) mehr Informationen als der Principal (z. B. Unternehmensleitung) besitzt, muß eine derartige asymmetrische Informationsbeziehung für eine zielgerichtete Koordination und Steuerung berücksichtigt werden. In einem Anreizvertrag wird die Höhe der Entlohnung an die Wirkung der Information (z. B. Leistungsfähigkeit des Agent) auf das Unternehmensziel geknüpft.Zu diesem Problem werden dynamische Koordinationsmechanismen untersucht, durch die eine wahrheitsgemäße Berichterstattung des Agent erreichbar wird. Für diese gewinnt der Tatbestand eine zentrale Bedeutung, ob sich der Principal zuverlässig an einen mehrperiodigen Vertrag mit dem Agent binden kann. Ferner ist relevant, in welchem Umfang die Information in aufeinanderfolgenden Perioden identisch, zeitlich unabhängig oder zeitlich abhängig ist.Wenn der Principal darüber hinaus die Handlungen des Agent nicht beobachten kann, sollte die Koordination und Steuerung nicht nur über Anreiz-, sondern auch über Vorgabesysteme (Ziel- und Budgetvorgaben) erfolgen. Im statischen und dynamischen Fall wird mit dem Bericht des Agent der Vorgabewert festgelegt und die Entlohnungsfunktion angepaßt. InhaltsverzeichnisInhaltsübersicht: Einleitung - 1. Koordination von Entscheidungen als zentrales Problem des Controlling: Koordinationsbedarf von Entscheidungen - Koordinationsinstrumente des Controlling - Anreizmechanismen zur Koordination von Entscheidungsträgern bei Informationsasymmetrie - Spieltheorie und Gestaltung eines Anreizschemas - 2. Dynamische Anreizsysteme für eine wahrheitsgemäße Berichterstattung: Das statische Grundmodell mit Adverse Selection - Überblick zu dynamischen Koordinationsmechanismen - Mehrperiodige Mechanismen mit Bindungskraft des Principal - Mehrperiodige Mechanismen ohne Bindungskraft des Principal - Wert der Bindungskraft des Principal in mehrperiodigen Beziehungen - Ergebnisse des dynamischen Adverse-Selection-Problems und Implikationen für das Controlling - 3. Koordination von Entscheidungsträgern durch dynamische Vorgabemechanismen: Koordination durch Vorgabemechanismen - Entwicklung eines dynamischen Vorgabemechanismus für unabhängige Unternehmensbereiche - Ergebnisse der Vorgabemechanismen für die dynamische Koordinationsproblematik und das Controlling - 4. Schlußbemerkung und Ausblick - Anhang - Literaturverzeichnis - Personenregister - Sachregister

**a theory of incentives in procurement and regulation:** Elemente der ökonomischen Raumstruktur Horst Todt, 1995-03-31 Der vorliegende Sammelband gibt einige Vorträge wieder, die anläßlich der Sitzung des Regionalwissenschaftlichen Ausschusses im Herbst 1993 in Freiberg (Sachsen) gehalten wurden. Dieses Gremium versucht, alle im deutschsprachigen Raum aktiven Forscher auf dem Gebiet der regionalen Ökonomik an einen Tisch zu bringen, um die einschlägige Diskussion voranzubringen. Die Zusammenkunft stand nicht unter einem Motto; es gab kein Generalthema und es gab auch kein Raster von Themen, auf das sich der Ausschuß eingeengt hätte. Vielmehr haben Mitglieder und einschlägig interessierte Gäste aus ihrer Arbeit berichtet. Diese Konzeption hat Vor- und Nachteile. Es darf einerseits nicht erwartet werden, daß alle wichtigen oder aktuellen Felder der Regionalwissenschaft vertreten sind, noch kann die Auswahl unter irgendeinem relevanten Aspekt repräsentativ sein; auch engere Teilgebiete sind so nicht systematisch zu erfassen. Andererseits darf man hoffen, daß die Fachvertreter genau die Themen behandeln, die sie selbst zur Zeit für wichtig halten; ein Optimist mag hoffen, daß dies auch das tatsächlich Wichtige sei. Eine solche Hoffnung gab auch den Ausschlag für den gewählten Weg: Es soll eine Momentaufnahme von Forschungsaktivitäten sein. Entsprechend heterogen war das Ergebnis. Verschiedene Ansätze, die durchaus auch differierende Positionen repräsentieren, sind in diesem Band zusammengefaßt. Sie reichen von strikt theoretischen Untersuchungen zu Überblicksarbeiten, von empirischen zu wirtschaftspolitischen Diskussionen. Einen rein theoretischen Vortrag hielt Hans Wiesmeth über lokale und regionale öffentliche Güter, die in einem geschlossenen Modell diskutiert werden. Er verband seine Überlegungen mit einem Plädoyer für Lindahl-Gleichgewichte. Klaus Schöler erlaubte einen Einblick in seine laufenden Untersuchungen zum Thema räumlicher Preistechniken. Reiner Wolff berichtete aus seiner Arbeit über genetische Algorithmen zur Lösung von Transport- und Rundreiseproblemen, ein Be

**a theory of incentives in procurement and regulation:** *Marktorientierte Steuerung im Krankenhaussektor* Kristian Foit, 2019-02-15 Im Rahmen der allgemeinen Diskussion um die Kostenentwicklung im Gesundheitssektor stellen Fragen der Wirtschaftlichkeit im Krankenhaussektor seit langer Zeit ein zentrales Thema dar. Vor diesem Hintergrund lässt sich bei den Veränderungen in den Rahmenbedingungen von Krankenhausbetrieben in Form der Krankenhausgesetzgebung eine zunehmende Tendenz zu einer marktorientierten Steuerung feststellen: Die Einführung eines leistungsorientierten und pauschalierten Vergütungssystems auf der Basis von Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) ab dem Jahre 2004 wird für die Leistungserbringer einen erhöhten Kosten- und Wettbewerbsdruck bedeuten. Die vorliegende Arbeit greift diesen

Aspekt als Ausgangspunkt für ein Gesamtkonzept der marktorientierten Steuerung im Krankenhaussektor auf. Dabei werden die durch die Reform angestoßenen Aus- und Wechselwirkungen auf das Krankenhausfinanzierungs- und Planungssystem (Steuerung von Krankenhäusern) diskutiert. Außerdem werden Anpassungsnotwendigkeiten für die betriebliche Steuerung der Leistungsprozesse in Krankenhäusern (Steuerung in Krankenhäuser) theoretisch und empirisch analysiert. Das Buch wendet sich an Dozenten und Studierende der Betriebswirtschaftslehre mit den Schwerpunkten des Krankenhausmanagements und der Gesundheitsökonomie sowie an interessierte Führungskräfte und Berater im Gesundheitswesen.

**a theory of incentives in procurement and regulation:** Handbook of Industrial Organization Mark Armstrong, Robert H. Porter, 2007-10-05 This is Volume 3 of the Handbook of Industrial Organization series (HIO). Volumes 1 & 2 published simultaneously in 1989 and many of the chapters were widely cited and appeared on graduate reading lists. Since the first volumes published, the field of industrial organization has continued to evolve and this volume fills the gaps. While the first two volumes of HIO contain much more discussion of the theoretical literature than of the empirical literature, it was representative of the field at that time. Since then, the empirical literature has flourished, while the theoretical literature has continued to grow, and this new volume reflects that change of emphasis.Thie volume is an excellent reference and teaching supplement for industrial organization or industrial economics, the microeconomics field that focuses on business behavior and its implications for both market structures and processes, and for related public policies.*Part of the renowned Handbooks in Economics series*Chapters are contributed by some of the leading experts in their fields*A source, reference and teaching supplement for industrial organizations or industrial economists

**a theory of incentives in procurement and regulation: Anreizsysteme in der Beschaffung** Jörg Beißel, 2013-03-08 Jörg Beißel analysiert die Abnehmer-Lieferanten-Beziehung als zentralen Baustein der Beschaffung und zeigt anhand eines praktischen Anwendungsfalles, dass die theoretisch abgeleiteten Ergebnisse teilweise über den Charakter von Gestaltungsempfehlungen hinausgehen und direkt in der Praxis implementiert werden können.

**a theory of incentives in procurement and regulation: OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform: China 2009 Defining the Boundary between the Market and the State** OECD, 2009-05-05 This review of China's regulatory system focuses on the overall economic context for regulatory reform, the government’s capacity to manage regulatory reform, competition policy and enforcement, and market openness.

**a theory of incentives in procurement and regulation:** *Finanzverträge und Finanzintermediation* Diemo Dietrich, Uwe Vollmer, 2015-02-27 Dieses Lehrbuch beschreibt - aus Sicht der Neuen Institutionenökonomik - die Möglichkeiten der Ausgestaltung von Finanzverträgen, das Verhalten von Banken auf Kapitalmärkten sowie die Auswirkungen von Transaktionskosten auf Finanzierungsbeziehungen. Darauf aufbauend können Erkenntnisse zur Wirkungsweise von Regulierungen im Bankensektor gewonnen werden. Das Buch bietet eine erste systematische Darstellung der Thematik in deutscher Sprache, die durch zahlreiche Übungsaufgaben mit Musterlösungen ergänzt wird.

**a theory of incentives in procurement and regulation: Umweltpolitik aus Sicht der Neuen Institutionenökonomik** , 2013-12-11 Marktwirtschaftliche Ansätze der Umweltpolitik beruhen auf dem Grundgedanken, daß für knappe Umweltgüter Preise zustande kommen müssen, die die Wirtschaftssubjekte zum sparsamen Umgang damit veranlassen. Solche Preise können direkt in Form von Steuern von staatlicher Seite festgesetzt werden, sie können aber auch indirekt zustande kommen, indem für die Nutzung von Umweltgütern Zertifikate ausgegeben und gehandelt werden. In beiden Fällen muß der Staat regulierend eingreifen. Eine Regulierungsbehörde steht dabei vor dem Problem, daß sie weder den Nutzen noch die Kosten einer Verbesserung der Umweltqualität kennt. Insbesondere hinsichtlich der Kosten besteht Informationsasymmetrie zwischen der Regulierungsbehörde einerseits und den Nutzern von Umweltgütern, vor allem den Unternehmen, andererseits. Dieses Problem steht im Mittelpunkt der vorliegenden Untersuchung.

Es geht darum, wie ein System von Anreizen geschaffen werden kann, das die Unternehmen veranlaßt, ihre Information über die Kosten einer Verbesserung der Umweltqualität offenzulegen und dadurch der Regulierungsbehörde eine Optimierung zu ermöglichen. Eine formal ähnliche Problemstellung ist in der Literatur für einen anderen Anwen dungsfall untersucht worden, nämlich für die Regulierung von Versorgungsunter nehmen. Dieser theoretische Ansatz wird in der vorliegenden Arbeit für den Bereich der Umweltpolitik übertragen. Daraus ergeben sich wichtige Einsichten über die Instrumente, mit denen man auch im Bereich der Umweltpolitik die Auswirkungen der Informationsasymmetrie bewältigen kann. Für die Theorie der Umweltpolitik bringt die Untersuchung beachtliche Anregungen. Herbert Hax Danksagung Die vorliegende Arbeit wurde am 22. Dezember 1994 von der Wirtschafts-und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität zu Köln als Dissertation angenommen.

**a theory of incentives in procurement and regulation: Energy Economics** Subhes C. Bhattacharyya, 2019-11-02 This book provides an updated and expanded overview of basic concepts of energy economics and explains how simple economic tools can be used to analyse contemporary energy issues in the light of recent developments, such as the Paris Agreement, the UN Sustainable Development Goals and new technological developments in the production and use of energy. The new edition is divided into four parts covering concepts, issues, markets, and governance. Although the content has been thoroughly revised and rationalised to reflect the current state of knowledge, it retains the main features of the first edition, namely accessibility, research-informed presentation, and extensive use of charts, tables and worked examples. This easily accessible reference book allows readers to gain the skills required to understand and analyse complex energy issues from an economic perspective. It is a valuable resource for students and researchers in the field of energy economics, as well as interested readers with an interdisciplinary background.

**a theory of incentives in procurement and regulation: Proceedings of the 19th International Symposium on Advancement of Construction Management and Real Estate** Liyin Shen, Kunhui Ye, Chao Mao, 2015-04-27 These conference proceedings cover an outstanding view for academics and professionals to share research findings on the latest developments in real estate and construction management. The Chinese Research Institute of Construction Management (CRIOCM) in collaboration with Chongqing University organized CRIOCM2014, the 19th International Symposium on "Advancement of Construction Management and Real Estate." The proceedings collect 105 selected papers addressing the following key themes: Sustainable Urbanization, Sustainable Construction, Urban Construction and Management, Affordable Housing, Urban Land Development and Utilization, Management for Large Infrastructure Projects, Green Construction Materials and Construction Waste Management, Development and Management for Mountainous Towns, Advancement of Construction Project Management, Redevelopment in Disaster Areas, Law and Policies for Construction and Real Estate, Information Technology for Construction Management and Real Estate and lastly Other Topics.

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